European Commission - Speech [Check Against Delivery] Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Annual Conference of the Commission Legal Service: "Towards a Genuine European Defence Union: the legal landscape of EU defence policy" Brussels, 17 April 2026 Towards a Genuine European Defence Union: the legal landscape of EU defence policy As a still young but experienced politician, I'm excited to see so many lawyers in o...
European Commission - Speech [Check Against Delivery] Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Annual Conference of the Commission Legal Service: "Towards a Genuine European Defence Union: the legal landscape of EU defence policy" Brussels, 17 April 2026 Towards a Genuine European Defence Union: the legal landscape of EU defence policy As a still young but experienced politician, I'm excited to see so many lawyers in one room. I was trying to remember if I had at any time in previous capacities, in national politics ever seen so many lawyers, it's really something. We politicians and lawyers sometimes we have different opinions about what's possible and what is impossible. But out from that discussion, I think progress is coming. So it is my very special honour to open this conference of the Commission Legal Service on the topic “Towards a Genuine European Defence Union: the legal landscape of EU defence policy.” And let me remind that in my Mission Letter, development of a genuine Defence Union is one of the key tasks. So let me begin with some kind of personal confession. The confession is this: in January I published a substantial paper on Defence. I focused on the deficit of institutional defence readiness, besides material defence readiness, the absence of effective platforms for unified political leadership in defence. I proposed a European Security Council format. I stand by what I argued then. But I confess that at that time I thought it was just me, and maybe a limited number of others who were concerned about the institutional side of defence. That is why I was sincerely surprised by what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently said. The Commission President in a very deep and strategic way showed her understanding of the major challenges for our times, when she spoke at the recent Ambassadors' Conference. I quote: “ We urgently need to reflect on whether our doctrine, our institutions and our decision making – all designed in a postwar world of stability and multilateralism – have kept pace with the speed of change around us. Whether the system that we built – with all of its well-intentioned attempts at consensus and compromise – is more a help or a hindrance to our credibility as a geopolitical actor .” She spoke about institutional deficit in European foreign policy. But in my view the same applies not only to our foreign policy, but also to our defence policy: Are our defence doctrine, defence institutions and our decision making in defence – all designed in a postwar world of stability and multilateralism, with prevailing intentions of compromise and consensus, – all the existing legal and constitutional constructs for European defence, as we find them in the Treaty of the European Union, are they more a help or a hindrance for our need to be ready to fight as Europe, not just as a combination of 27? That question became even more acute after US Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge Colby, in February, told Allied Ministers in Brussels that what he described as the post Cold War “NATO 2.0” is no longer fit for purpose. He said – we need a “NATO 3.0” and Europe should take over “the preponderance of the forces required” to deter. Europe should take primary responsibility to defeat conventional aggression in Europe. And in March, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Alexus Grynkewich stated to the US Senate that the American command in Europe, USEUCOM, is: “prudently and expeditiously transferring primary responsibility for Europe's conventional defense” to European allies. So Americans will stay in a secondary role, like they are doing now in Ukraine. For all to hear and to read, he described a deliberate shift from a US-centric model to a European- centric model in European defence. Whether one welcomes this language or not, we should make no mistake: this is not rhetoric alone. This is planning, and this is real. In this context, your conference title could not be more timely, and called for. We know where we want to arrive – at a genuine European Defence Union. The big question, to which we need to find an answer, is also clear: Are the existing legal landscape, existing Treaties and institutions, built on the basis of those treaties, existing decision-making rules according to the existing treaties – are they more a help or a hindrance for European defence in new circumstances, when we need to be ready to take into our hands the responsibility for European defence? To be ready to fight as united Europe, not just as a combination of 27? That is why I have more questions for this Conference, than answers. But as somebody once said: the formulation of good questions is half the job. And it's good that you are here, Members of the legal service. Community. You can do the other half of the job: and help to answer the questions! It's all about teamwork! Until now the Treaty on European Union had a very clear legal definition at least how I understand it: National security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State; Common security and defence policy as it is defined in the Treaty is more for external actions; territorial defence is provided by NATO coordination, not by the EU. In territorial defence of Member States, the EU only provides the obligation of mutual assistance in the case of military aggression. The famous 42(7) Article. So the first question : With the NATO 3.0 concept, territorial collective defence in Europe moves from transatlantic collective defence to more European collective defence. Is the Treaty on European Union fit for such a collective European defence? Is Article 42(2) about common defence in Common Security and Defence Policy or about common territorial defence of Europe? Second question : According to the Treaty on European Union, defence is a national prerogative. The outcome of such a historical legacy is total industrial fragmentation. The question is how to overcome this? Can only a bottom-up approach, as we had until now – based on the national defence prerogative – resolve this challenge? Or can we have united political leadership for European defence and a top-down approach in order to overcome fragmentation? Is the Treaty on European Union fit for that? Third question : In Munich this year, Chancellor Friedrich Merz spoke about the European pillar of NATO. He proposed to build a European pillar of NATO around Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union. In that case which article will be the backbone of European defence – this Article 42(7) or NATO Article 5? Fourth question : What will Europeans be additionally expected to do to strengthen the European pillar of NATO? If there will be a need to Europeanize NATO headquarters – is the Treaty on European Union ready for that? Fifth question : In order to fill potential gaps if American troops stationed in Europe will be shifted to Indo-Pacific, Europe possibly will need to create a European Rapid Reaction force, or what somebody calls, European Army. Is the Treaty on European Union ready for that? Sixth question: If Putin decides to test NATO Article 5, as our military intelligence services publicly are saying such a possibility is realistic, some members of the EU in the neighbourhood of Russia will face aggression of Russian army with all its battle tested experience, with the possibility to use millions of drones. Only the Ukrainian army has similar experience. How can we integrate that Ukrainian experience with European defence capabilities? As you know, politically, NATO is not available for Ukraine. EU membership is still complicated. Is the Treaty on European Union ready to solve this challenge? Seventh question : Can a European Defence Union be a solution for the integration of Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Norway with the defence capabilities of the European Union? Can we agree that in that case it would be impossible to squeeze such a European Defence Union into the existing Treaty on European Union? Eighth question : In that case, would a new Intergovernmental Treaty on European Defence Union be the best approach? As was the case with the Schengen Treaty? Question Number 9 : Would it be possible in that case to create a European Security Council as the leadership institution of a European Defence Union? With the big E5 countries as permanent members, 3 rotational members and the leaders of EU institutions among Security Council members? For collective leadership of European Defence Union with democratic majority decision making. And for “swift preparation of most important decisions” – as Angela Merkel suggested back in 2018, when she spoke about the initiative to build a European Security Council, when such prepared decisions then can be supported by a majority of European Defence Union Members, like usually happens with Coalitions of the Willing. Tenth question: Could the new Intergovernmental Treaty on European Defence Union be built on the principles of Article 42(7) on “mutual assistance”? And the last question, Number 11: Could this Treaty on European Defence Union create provisions for European military headquarters? Could the Treaty provide for the possibility of a European Army and for European Common Defence Stockpiles? And for proper financial arrangements for European defence? Being conservative in my nature, I am always ready to defend existing law. But when we need to defend our territory, the law needs to provide the right possibilities for European defence, that we would be ready to fight as Europe, not just as combination of 27. In short, for our defence readiness we need also legal defence readiness. We need you! And at the end, – as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urged us – let's finally answer the main question: The present existing legal and constitutional structure for European defence, as we find it in the Treaty on European Union, – is it more a help or a hindrance for our need to be ready to fight as Europe? My sincere answer: today in my view it's not enough for our defence. That is why I urge the creation a new, genuine European Defence Union, which would include also the United Kingdom, Norway and Ukraine. And to do that let's have an additional new Intergovernmental Treaty. Let's have the law for the defence of Europe by Europe and for peace in Europe! SPEECH/26/841
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