European Commission - Speech [Check Against Delivery] Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Forum Europa event “Ideas to Strengthen the Union” Brussels, 16 March 2026 Dear all, Today I want to talk with you about ideas on how to strengthen Europe. It's absolutely clear why we need to strengthen Europe. What clarity we need today: is how to make Europe stronger. Last week Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gav...
European Commission - Speech [Check Against Delivery] Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Forum Europa event “Ideas to Strengthen the Union” Brussels, 16 March 2026 Dear all, Today I want to talk with you about ideas on how to strengthen Europe. It's absolutely clear why we need to strengthen Europe. What clarity we need today: is how to make Europe stronger. Last week Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gave a powerful speech to the traditional annual Ambassadors Conference. It inspired me to make some comments for you today. First of all, the Commission President spoke a simple truth: “ Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, for a world that has gone and will not return ” We can't face today's challenges with yesterday's solutions. That is why we need change. Only change can make us strong: As the President said: “[W]e need a clear-eyed and hard look at our foreign policy in today's world, both how it is designed and how it is deployed”. I want to add: we need this same “clear-eyed and hard look” not only at our foreign policy, but also at our all security and defence policy. And I absolutely agree with the Commission President when she pushes us for deep reflection: “ We urgently need to reflect on whether our doctrine, our institutions and our decision making – all designed in a postwar world of stability and multilateralism – have kept pace with the speed of change around us. Whether the system that we built – with all of its well-intentioned attempts at consensus and compromise – is more a help or a hindrance to our credibility as a geopolitical actor .” The same applies not only to our foreign policy, but also to our defence policy. We need to ask ourselves an open question: “ [W]hether our doctrine, our institutions and our decision making” in defence of Europe - “ [H]ave kept pace with the speed of change around us” and “is more a help or a hindrance to our credibility as a geopolitical actor?” The Commission President makes clear the direction of travel: “[W]e have started a generational project: European independence” . Independence also in defence. In order to be secure - we need to be independent and strong: “In order to seek peace in today's world, Europe must be able to project power – to deter, to counter and to increase our influence. In simple terms, we need to invest in the means to protect our territory, economy, democracy and way of life./…/. In fact, security must become the organising principle of our action. This must be the default mindset – from defence to data, from industry to infrastructure, from tech to trade.” So, we have quite a clear vision of what kind of European security and defence independence we need to build. And we know that doctrines for our foreign policy, security and defence policy, our institutions and decision making are no longer fit for the “new world order”. Before reflecting about what and how needs to be changed in our defence doctrines, institutions and decision making, let's remind ourselves about the challenges of today: First , our transatlantic partners are shifting towards the Indo-Pacific. They are asking for Europeans to take responsibility for conventional defence and peace in Europe. We have no rational reasons to disagree with such a request. Second , - we need to be ready to be independent. And able to be strong in Europe's defence. Third , - while building our independence and European strength, we need to see: in Russia's war against Ukraine – there's no peace on the horizon. There is a real possibility, that we shall face Russian aggression against us. We need to remember: Russia spends on its military in PPP terms – 85% of EU defence spending; Russia is ready to use from 7 to 9 million drones in 2026; And war in Iran: can hit us not only with increasing energy prices, but also with ballistic missile attacks up to 3000 kilometres in range. And there will be a shortage of anti-ballistic missile supplies to Ukraine, to Gulf countries and to Europe. NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte says that Europe needs to increase its air-defence capabilities by 400%. In order to have a more structural approach to all those issues, related with the challenge how to make Europe independent and stronger in defence, I will go into three groups of questions: on institutional issues; on “ Ukrainian” questions; and I will end with industrial challenges. The first institutional question: what is our strength. Unity or fragmentation ? According to the EU Treaties – defence is a national responsibility. That is why we have 27 national defence policies, 27 national defence budgets and 27 national armies. Joseph Borell was the first who called our national armies - “bonsai” armies. The consequence of that - we also have 27 defence industries, and no common defence market. According to Mario Draghi, this is the main reason for the weakness of Europe's defence industry, and the biggest obstacle to its global leadership and for its capability to scale up. In the defence of Europe, collective defence is realized by NATO, but the EU is absent. I repeat the Commission President's demand for reflection: Are the European defence doctrine, European institutions and European decision making, that exist as our historical legacy, - are they fit for today's world? I'll put it differently, with a very simple question: Would the United States be militarily stronger, if they had 50 armies on the states' level, 50 sovereign state level defence policies and 50 defence budgets? The answer is obvious. Such fragmentation would not make the United States stronger. So why do we think that fragmentation of Europe into 27 defence policies and 27 national armies will make us strong enough? Article 42(2) of The Treaty on European Union demands from Member States the “ progressive framing of a common Union defence policy”, which “ will lead to a common defence”. So, it's a Treaty obligation for Member States to seek “common defence”. Very concretely, that means: we must seek a different defence doctrine, different institutions, different decision making, from what we have today. If we don't do that now, before a possible Russian aggression, when will we? Only when the aggression hits us or maybe only after? Or never? Why don't we listen to the people? According to an opinion poll last year, around 70% of citizens in Spain, Belgium and Germany prefer defence of their country by European defence, including a European Army. Instead of defence by a national army (10%) or NATO (12%). By making European defence stronger and more independent we shall make the European pillar of NATO stronger – which at the moment is losing the trust of European citizens. And we shall make NATO stronger. Leaders of Europe – Ursula Von der Leyen, Friedrich Merz, Emanuel Macron, Keir Starmer – all of them were speaking about the European pillar of NATO during the Munich Conference. Chancellor Friedrich Merz was even more specific: “ Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, we undertake to aid and assist one another in the case of armed aggression in Europe. We now need to spell out how we are going to organise this at European level – not as a substitute for NATO, but rather as a strong, self-sustaining pillar within the Alliance. ” Europeanization of NATO on the European continent also will demand to be less dependent on American resources. That is why we need European strategic enablers in order to replace American ones; and a European Rapid Reaction Force (or European Army), to replace the 100,000 strong American “Rapid Reaction” force in Europe. And finally: if defence policies in Europe stay fragmented, our defence industries in Europe will remain fragmented and will become even more fragmented with larger national defence spending. If we continue with the same institutional defence policy, we will also continue with the same: industrial duplications; fragmentation; lack of standardization and lack of harmonization. And we will have very few capabilities to build pan-European defence projects, which demand unity and political will to overcome fragmentation. And ultimately we will not be able to achieve our defence independence and our defence readiness. Now - a few “Ukrainian” questions Ukraine is defending us. During more than four years of terrible war. EU and Member States are the biggest supporters of Ukraine defence. But always we have to answer the question: are we doing enough to support Ukraine? Now we are preparing the 60 billion euro part of Ukraine Support Loan for the defence of Ukraine. Only the strength of Ukraine is the way to a just peace. Such a peace will come if Ukraine starts to prevail against Russia. A report by Norwegian think-tank CORISK shows that too small an European support and as consequence - Russian victory, - would cost Europe twice as much, as a sufficient European support for Ukraine in order for Ukraine to start to prevail and to achieve a just peace. Defence investment is always expensive, but non-investment will always cost much more. That is why it's simply cost effective for us to invest into the strength of Ukraine's defence and into Europe's defence. And we need Ukraine for our defence. If Russia attacks us, EU Member States will face a Russian battle tested army, much stronger than in 2022, able to use almost 10 million drones. No NATO Member State in Europe has such a battle tested experience. Only the military forces of Ukraine have. But: are we preparing to integrate Ukrainian battle tested military capabilities with our own defence capabilities? With the capabilities of the EU? How are we going to do that? Ukraine is being asked to help Gulf countries to fight against Shahed drones. Saudi Arabia is asking Ukraine to help produce millions of drones-interceptors. If Gulf countries, the US and Israel are recognizing the excellence of Ukraine's military expertise and of their defence industry, then what is our strategy? Are we ready to integrate Ukraine's defence industrial capabilities into European defence industry? Do we understand that such integration is a vital interest for Europe, for an independent and strong defence of Europe? How can we achieve this integration in the nearest future? Can we do this by taking the initiative for a European Defence Union, a task defined in the agenda of this Commission? German Chancellor Merz recently also urged to do that, when he “ called for the European Union to transform into a full-fledged European Defense Union, urging Europe to take greater responsibility for its security amid evolving global challenges ”. Are we ready to include Ukraine into the architecture of the European Defence Union? Together with the United Kingdom and Norway? Definitely, that would make us stronger! And it would be a good stepping stone for Ukraine towards full membership in EU in the nearest future. And now - on industry Fragmentation of industry, as I said before, is a legacy of our historical experience with fragmentation of defence policy. That is why it is not so easy to overcome. And there is article 346 from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on the security derogation from Common Market rules, which at the moment it is invoked too often and too broadly, and so blocks true European cooperation. That is the reason why EU rules are unevenly applied in defence market. And by themselves - they are too complex and slow. Which obstructs cross-border cooperation. The consequence - defence industry faces national barriers and national protectionism, different national licences and different requirements. So, while developing our defence capabilities, and for that reason procuring new weapons and using new funds for defence, we also need to do everything we can to overcome fragmentation of our defence market. This is how we can strengthen our defence industry, and enable it to scale up production. And that is also why we need to create a common market in defence. Because I am more and more worried about the lack of industrial scale-up of production. Defence finances scaled-up, demands are scaling-up, but production scale-up is lagging behind. The consequence - prices are increasing, delivery time also. Production scale-up is also what we need to learn from Ukraine. From 2022 to 2026, Ukrainian defence industrial production increased by 50 times, from 1 billion euro of total production in 2022, up to 50 billion euro - in 2025. And at the same time the Ukrainians managed to create the most innovative defence industry in the world. We need to scale up production for our defence needs, and for the needs of Ukraine defence. And we need to do it now. That it's why I started the “Missile Tour”. Because missiles for air defence, anti-ballistic missiles, now are the biggest deficit. The numbers are clear - in 2025 Ukraine faced 2000 Russian missile attacks. 900 of them – ballistic. In order to destroy them Ukraine needs around 2000 anti-ballistic missiles per year. Mainly Patriot missiles. The “New York Times” reported that in just the first five days of hostilities with Iran, the US and its allies have expended over 800 anti-ballistic Patriot missiles. Public sources say total Patriot missiles production is 750 per year. That is why we need independent missile production in Europe. Innovative Ukrainians are planning to develop their own anti-ballistic defence system, maybe together with European partners. We are working on that. To develop a European air-defence system, with a strong anti-ballistic component, we first need to learn how to overcome fragmentation, and how to be successful in the development of pan-European defence flagship projects. Up till now such a success was almost non-existent. Fragmentation prevailed. Already 10 years ago former Commission President Jean Claude Juncker was speaking about the same problems. Now we are doing a lot to change this legacy. We are creating new instruments to assist Member States to learn how to do defence together through joint procurement or joint development of weapon systems. And today, on this very day, March 16th, Member States need to notify us about their interest to develop pan-European Defence Projects of Common interest (EDPCI), which will be approved by the Council and supported by EU funds. Ukraine will also be able to participate. That is how step-by-step we are learning to be more united. At the end - about decision making We must be ambitious for our defence: on defragmentation, on scale, on speed. But if we want speed on industry side, we also need speed on the policy side. We cannot endlessly discuss and negotiate for example the Defence Simplification Omnibus or other defence proposals for almost a year. We cannot afford to water them down. If we are ambitious about defence, we need to show ambitious speed and scale in our political decisions. Not only in the Commission, but also in the Council, and also in the European Parliament. Ukrainians are showing us an example of industrial ambition, speed and scale. And of the speed of political decisions. Because they are at war. We are not at peace either. But by continuing traditional slow, peacetime decision making it looks as if we are still dreaming that peace in Europe is eternal. We need to radically change this attitude. We need to awake from this dream to prevent the nightmare of war. That is why we need to understand, that our defence doctrines, institutions, and decision making are no longer fit for the challenging reality of today. And we need to change, if we really want to be independent and strong. For the last 10 years we have repeated the same arguments and the same recipes of what to do with our defence. With the doctrines, institutions and decision making. But nothing had happened. Why not? In part, the answer for me personally is clear: there is no effective platform for unified political leadership, that allows for discussions and strategic decisions on reforms in European defence. Strategic change in our defence is the task, first of all, for Member States. But sometimes a bottom- up approach is not enough. Big reforms demand strong collective top-down leadership. That is why in the last weeks and months I have said: if we now really want to stop repeating the mistakes of the past, if we really want to do better, we need first of all to create such a platform for collective top-down leadership – a European Security Council! But that is a topic for another conversation! SPEECH/26/610
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